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A CONCENTRATED EFFORT TO CLARIFY THE 
IMPRECISION OF ITS APPLICABILITY  
IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
SUSAN  DANA1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the covenant of good faith and fair dealing “does not lend itself to 
precise definition,”2 several state courts have attempted to define parameters for 
applying this covenant in the employment context.3  This article summarizes the 
evolution of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as one exception4 to the 
employment at-will doctrine,5 and discusses court decisions in a small minority of 
jurisdictions that currently recognize this exception.  To do this, this article first 
analyzes the somewhat erratic and inconsistent definitions of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealings adopted by the courts.  Second, this article explores the 
different rationales given by the courts to validate and justify their decisions.  Finally, 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor of Business, College of Business and Technology, Black Hills State 
University; J.D., University of South Dakota; M.B.A., University of South Dakota; B.S., University of 
Nebraska, Lincoln.   
 
2 Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 789 (Alaska 1989).  
 
3 Charles v. Interior Reg’l Hous. Auth., 55 P.3d 57, 62 (Alaska 2002).  The Alaska Supreme Court 
recognized two possible ways that an employer might breach the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  First, the court recognized a subjective breach, which included terminations “for the purpose 
of depriving him or her of one of the benefits of the contract.”  Id. quoting Finch v. Greatland Foods, 
Inc., 21 P.3d 1282, 1286-87 (Alaska 2001).  Second, the court recognized an objective breach, which 
“would include disparate employee treatment, terminations on grounds that were unconstitutional, 
and firings that violated public policy.” Id. citing Era Aviation, Inc. v. Seekins, 973 P.2d 1137, 1139 
(Alaska 1999); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Alaska 1992).  
 
4 In addition to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, state courts commonly recognize two 
additional exceptions: the public policy exception and the implied-in-fact contract exception.  See 
Mark D. Wagoner, Jr., The Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will Doctrine in Ohio: A Need for a 
Legislative Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1799, 1806 (1996).   
 
5 The doctrine is commonly defined as “employment that is usually undertaken without a contract and 
that may be terminated at any time, by either the employer or the employee, without cause.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 545 (7th ed. 1999). 
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this article concludes by comparing and contrasting the minority and majority views 
concerning adoption of an exception.   
 
I. EVOLUTION OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND  
FAIR DEALING AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE 
 
A.  The Evolution of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine 
 
The employment-at-will doctrine, as it exists today, emerged after the 
inception of the Industrial Revolution.6  Before that time, American courts applied 
the English rule,7 which presumed a one-year term of employment absent an 
agreement stating otherwise.8  According to the English rule, founded on traditional 
master servant principles, an employer could terminate an employee before the end 
of the one-year term only for reasonable cause.9  Notably, the English rule did not 
afford employees the same reciprocal right to terminate the working relationship.10   
 
The Industrial Revolution changed the landscape of the workplace by 
transforming the once agrarian employment scheme into an industrialized, large-scale 
environment.11 The newly industrialized environment increased significantly 
employers’ demand for labor.12  As such, employers desired more control over and 
                                                 
6  See Brian T. Kohn, Contracts of Convenience:  Preventing Employers From Unilaterally Modifying Promises 
Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 806 (2003).  As a result of the Industrial 
Revolution, employers’ needs changed.  Id. at 806 n.41.  Workforces grew in number and employers 
needed more flexibility in dealing with their employees.  Id.  The employment at-will doctrine proved 
to be a viable solution to meet employers’ needs.  Id.      
 
7 Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., Inc., 381 S.E.2d 445, 446 (N.C. 1989). 
 
8 Timothy R. Timmernan, Legislative Attempts to Modify the Employment At-Will Doctrine: Will the Public 
Policy Exception Be the Next Step?, 14  J. CORP. L. 241, 243 (1988). 
 
9 Linda Forsythe, Duration of Employment-At-Will, 56 UMKC L. REV. 343, 344 (1988). 
 
10 Id.  
 
11Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Employment-At-Will: The True Origins of the 
Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 94 (1996).    
 
12 Kohn, supra note 6, at 806 n.41.    
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flexibility in their workforce than afforded by the English rule.13  During the 
Industrial Revolution, employers found the English rule too rigid for the needs of 
the changing workplace.  Subsequently, in his Master Servant treatise, Horace Wood 
proposed an alternative at-will rule, dubbed the American rule,14 (hereinafter, the 
“American rule” or the “Rule”).  In articulating his rule, Wood stated: 
 
[W]ith us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is a 
prima facie hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a 
yearly hiring, the burden is on him to establish it by proof.  A hiring 
at so much a day, a week, month or year, no time being specified, is 
an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day 
even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may 
serve.15   
 
The adoption of the Rule by the courts,16 which was consistent with the 
theoretical framework of freedom of contract principles, was certainly a dramatic 
change from the English rule in that either party could terminate the employment 
relationship at any time for any reason.17  In recognizing that the American rule was 
premised on equality of rights for the employee and the employer, the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee stated: 
 
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they 
please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or 
for no cause, or even bad cause…. It is a right which an employee 
                                                 
13 Cathyrn C. Dakin, Protecting Attorneys Against Wrongful Discharge: Extension of the Public Policy Exception, 
44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 1047 (1995). 
 
14 HORACE WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 134, at 272 (1877).   
 
15 Id. 
 
16  Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment 
At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 681 (1994).  Commentators have suggested that seven jurisdictions 
recognized the at-will rule before Horace Wood’s treatise was published.   
 
17 Wagoner, supra note 4, at 1806 n.11.   
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may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause 
or want of cause as the employer.18    
 
Although the American rule lacked any significant legal foundation, the 
courts were becoming more intolerant with the traditional English rule; they quickly 
began adopting the American rule as the framework by which all at-will employment 
relationships would be governed.19  Currently, the Rule remains the default rule in 
American employment law.20   
 
B. Erosion of the Employment At-Will Rule 
 
Even though the American rule was theoretically based on the equality of 
rights between the employee and employer, the broad sweeping adherence by the 
courts to the at-will doctrine21 caused some to criticize the Rule for its harshness, 
perceived imbalance, and unfairness. 22  Critics of the at-will rule argued that the rule 
had a disparate impact on employees by conferring absolute power upon the 
employer to discharge employees.23  They argued that because the employer had 
significantly greater economic resources than the employee, the separation of an 
employee from the workforce would be much more detrimental to the employee 
than the employer.24   Recognizing a need for an exception to the Rule, the Supreme 
                                                 
18 Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 
179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915). 
 
19 Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Ariz. 1985).  The Supreme Court of 
Arizona noted, “none of the four cases cited by Wood actually supported the rule.”  Id.  See also Kelly 
McWilliams, The Employment Handbook as a Contractual Limitation on the Employment At Will Doctrine, 31 
VILL. L. REV. 335, 338 (1986) (arguing the new rule that Wood proposed had little legal analysis to 
support it). 
 
20Richard J. Pratt, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments on the 
Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 199 (1990). 
 
21 Richard H. Winters, Employee Handbooks and Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196, 198 
(1985). 
 
22 Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326, 329 
(1991). 
 
23 See infra note 20 at 198. 
 
24 See infra note 6 at 807. 
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Court of New Jersey stated, “[t]he twentieth century has witnessed significant 
changes in socioeconomic values that have led to reassessment of the common law 
rule.”25  The court continued by recognizing the existence of criticism that focused 
on the “compatibility of the traditional at will doctrine with the realities of modern 
economic and employment practices.”26  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in 
referring to the Rule stated, “[r]ecent analysis has pointed out the shortcomings of 
the mutuality theory.  With the rise of large corporations conducting specialized 
operations and employing relatively immobile workers who often have no other 
place to market their skills, recognition that the employer and employee do not stand 
on equal footing is realistic.”27 
 
 With several courts and commentators agreeing that the Rule was inherently 
unfair because of differing levels of bargaining power, coupled with the fact that the 
doctrine afforded a wrongfully discharged employee absolutely no remedy,28 gradual 
erosion transpired to effectually impose limitations upon the applicability of the 
doctrine.  First, Congress initiated the movement towards eroding the doctrine with 
the passage of the National Labor Relations Act.29 Several other legislative 
enactments followed, such as the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act,30 the 
                                                 
25 Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (N.J. 1980).  Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation 
employed the Plaintiff, Dr. Pierce.  She had been a member of a project team that was developing a 
liquid drug known as lopermide.  The formulation of this drug, as it was proposed, contained 
saccharin, which Dr. Pierce believed to be potentially harmful.  Due to the controversial nature of 
saccharin, she believed that continuing to work on the project would violate the Hippocratic oath that 
she had taken.  Therefore, she submitted a letter of resignation.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
upheld a motion for summary judgment granted to the employer.  
 
26 Id. 
 
27 Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981), as modified on denial of rehearing 
(Ill. 1981). In arguing retaliatory discharge, the Plaintiff in this case alleged that he had been 
terminated from his managerial position with International Harvester Company for providing 
information to authorities regarding another employee’s possible criminal violation.  Based on public 
policy, the court held that the Plaintiff had stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.  
 
28 Michael D. Strong, Personnel Policy Manuals as Legally Enforceable Contracts: The Implied-In-Fact Contract – 
A Limitation on the Employer’s Right to Terminate At Will, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 368, 371 (1990). 
 
29 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). 
 
30 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988). 
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Occupational Safety and Health Act,31 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,32 
to effectuate a significant encroachment upon the at-will doctrine.  These statutes 
limited the absoluteness of an employer’s ability to terminate an employee.  No 
longer was the employer able to terminate an employee “for any reason.”33  In 
addition to the statutory exceptions to the at-will rule, judicial exceptions emerged 
that contributed to the continuous erosion of the doctrine.  Courts have recognized 
three general exceptions to the at-will rule: termination that violates public policy, 
termination where an implied-in-fact contract was breached, and termination where a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached by the employer.34  Although 
the first two exceptions are more widely recognized by American courts,35 this article 
focuses on the third exception. 
 
C. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an  
Exception to the Employment At-Will Rule 
 
 This cause of action is predicated on the existence of a contract between the 
employee and employer, albeit at-will.36  Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts states that every contract contains an implied covenant that both parties are 
compelled to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing.37  The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey expounded on this principle by examining a comment to the 
Restatement stating, “[g]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract 
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the 
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct 
characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards of 
                                                 
31 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994). 
 
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). 
 
33 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (prohibiting, among other things, the termination of an employee based 
on race, color, religion, national origin, or gender).  
 
34 See supra note 21, at 204. 
 
35 See supra note 4, at 1806.   
 
36 Id. 
 
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
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decency, fairness or reasonableness.”38  Consequently, because the employee and 
employer have formed a contractual relationship, the obligation prescribed in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts is applicable to the parties.  Hence, the duty is 
one that is imposed by law.  One court’s interpretation of the duty is, “[i]n every 
contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will 
have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the 
fruits of the contract.”39   In essence, courts are simultaneously imposing the at-will 
doctrine, which states that either party may terminate the relationship for any reason, 
and the contractual principle of good faith and fair dealing, which effectually asserts, 
in part, the notion that the parties are prohibited from terminating the relationship 
for any reason.   Because of this, many courts refuse to recognize this exception and 
declare that employment at-will contracts are exempt from the rule governing all 
other contracts.40  Summarizing this position, the Supreme Court of Kansas stated 
that the rule pronounced in Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 205, “is 
overly broad and should not be applicable to employment-at-will contracts.”41   To 
                                                 
38 Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1126 (N.J. 2001) quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
 
39 Id. at 1126-27.  See also CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 654A(A), Kaufman supp. (1984) (stating that 
“the obligation [is] to preserve the spirit of the bargain rather than the form,” and “[i]t is moreover a 
group of specific rules which evolved to insure that the basic purpose of contract law is carried out, 
the protection of reasonable expectations of parties induced by promise.”). 
 
40 See, e.g., Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., 433 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 1988).  This was a wrongful 
discharge case before the Supreme Court of South Dakota whereby the Plaintiff had been discharged 
by his employer after approximately ten years of service.  The Plaintiff had just taken four days of sick 
leave and upon returning to work, he was discharged.  Allegedly, he had been terminated in violation 
of his implied contract and in violation of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  In 
providing a justification as to why the court should recognize the breach of covenant claim, the 
Plaintiff argued that the termination was “not in the best interest of the economic system or the 
public good.”  Despite this argument, however, the court refused to recognize this as an exception to 
the at-will doctrine.   
 
41 Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 851-52, (Kan. 1987).  Randy Morriss, production supervisor, 
and Debra White, secretary, brought this wrongful discharge case against their former employer.  
Morriss was asked by his supervisor to retrieve a car from Greenville, South Carolina, to which he 
agreed.   Unbeknownst to management, White decided to take time off of work and take the trip with 
Morriss.  White paid all of her own expenses for the trip.  Subsequently, both parties were terminated 
due to “dishonesty, breach of trust, and for increasing the company’s insurance liability.”  In addition, 
there was evidence of the supervisor’s strong religious beliefs and values and how this trip 
contradicted those values because the couple was not married.  The Plaintiffs argued that this 
termination was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Even though the 
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the contrary, another court noted, “[w]e do not feel that we should treat employment 
contracts as a special type of agreement in which the law refuses to imply the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that it implies in all other contracts.”42  
 
The first enunciation of the Covenant can be found in the case of Monge 
v. Beebe Rubber Co.43  In Monge, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire faced a 
scenario in which an employer terminated its employee because she had refused to 
date her foreman.44  In recognizing an exception, the court stated, “[a] termination by 
the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or 
malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interests of the economic system or 
the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract.”45 
 
 Compare the variant application in the Monge decision to that of the 
application in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.46  Fortune, the plaintiff, was a 61 
year-old at-will salesman for National Cash Register (“NCR”).47  According to his 
contract, Fortune was to receive, in addition to a fixed salary, a commission on all 
sales made in his assigned territory, regardless of whether he made the sale or not.48   
Prior to his termination, Fortune was credited with a significant sale, which resulted 
                                                                                                                                     
Court did recognize that the implied covenant was recognized in commercial transactions under the 
Uniform Commercial Code and certain construction contracts, they refused to apply the same 
contractual principle to employment contracts.  Interestingly, the concurring opinion stated that “[i]t 
is ludicrous that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been adopted pertaining to 
commercial transactions (see K.S.A. 84-1-203) but has not been adopted for transactions involving 
human working conditions.” 
 
42 Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1040.  The court was explicit in defining the parameters in which this 
exception would be recognized.  The opinion outlined that the covenant “protects the right of the 
parties to an agreement to receive the benefits of the agreement that they have entered into.”  
 
43 Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974). 
 
44 Id. 
 
45 Id. at 551. 
 
46 Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). 
 
47 Id. at 1253. 
 
48 Id. 
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in a bonus commission of $92,079.99.49  After only receiving a portion of that 
commission, NCR terminated Fortune’s employment.  Following his termination, 
Fortune brought suit arguing that NCR had breached the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.   In its decision, the court stated, “we believe that where, as 
here, commissions are to be paid for work performed by the employee, the 
employer’s decision to terminate its at will employee should be made in good 
faith.”50  In agreeing with the jury, the court continued, “the termination of Fortune’s 
twenty-five years of employment as a salesman with NCR the next business day after 
NCR obtained a $5,000,000 order from First National was motivated by a desire to 
pay Fortune as little of the bonus credit as it could.”51 As a result, the court found in 
this situation that the termination was not made in good faith, and that NCR was 
liable to Fortune for a breach of contract.52   
 
In addition to Massachusetts, several other jurisdictions have adopted the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception, thus gradually eroding the 
at-will doctrine.  As one court summarized, “[t]he covenant [of good faith and fair 
dealing] requires cooperation in carrying out the contract and honesty in creating or 
settling disputes.”53 
 
II.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE COVENANT 
 
The cause of action for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing has been often complex and difficult for courts to define.  Some critics, 
such as Justice Stein of the New Jersey Supreme Court, argue that the covenant has 
been applied inconsistently and has proven to be unpredictable.  In Noye v. Hoffmann-
LaRoche Inc.,54 Justice Stein noted “concepts such as good faith and fair dealing are 
                                                 
49 Id. at 1254. 
 
50 Id. at 1256. 
 
51 Id. at 1258. 
 
52 Id. at 1255-56. 
 
53 Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 777 (Cal. 1990) (citations omitted). 
 
54 Noye v. Hoffmann-LaRoche Inc., 570 A.2d 12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
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chameleonlike in character, necessarily assuming the colorings of the surroundings in 
which they find themselves.”55    
 
In examining the variable interpretations of the covenant, several definitions 
and corresponding justifications emerge that effectually set out circumstances where 
the court might read the covenant into the contract. 
 
A. When Earned Benefits are Denied Due to Termination 
 
Several courts have permitted the application of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in at-will employment when there has been a denial of benefits 
earned by the employee.56 This fairly broad sweeping category encompasses the 
denial of numerous forms of benefits including commission due,57 wages earned,58 
profit share,59 pension benefits,60 and severance benefits.61  In addition to these 
                                                 
55 Id. at 18. 
 
56 But see J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal to Demarginalize 
Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 365 (1995).  The author suggests that these courts have 
“floundered and misapplied” the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.   
 
57 Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.  But see Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 663 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(“[Under Massachusetts law,] litigants may not recover damages for future, prospective benefits not 
earned by past services.”). 
 
58 Cook v. Alexander and Alexander of Conn., Inc., 488 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Conn. 1985) (This court, 
“has thus expressed a willingness to allow an action for the breach of good faith and fair dealing when 
the challenged discharge is allegedly related to the withholding of wages.”). See also Magnan 
v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984); Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908 
(Mass. 1982); Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21 (Mass. 1981). 
 
59 Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983) (employee denied a ten percent profit 
sharing arrangement).  But see Pollen v. Aware, Inc., 762 N.E.2d 900 (Mass. 2002) (employer not liable 
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing after attempt was made to retroactively 
deprive employee stock options). 
 
60 K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987). 
 
61 Kulins v. Malso, a Microdot Co., Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Bolling v. Clevepak 
Corp., 484 N.E.2d 1367, 1367 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
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monetary benefits, the exception encompasses other benefits, such as the denial of 
sick leave62 and job security.63      
 
B. Termination Contrary to Public Policy 
 
Some jurisdictions have found that a termination in violation of public policy 
may establish a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in an 
at-will relationship.  Retaliatory discharge, for example, is one such violation of 
public policy that has recently emerged in this context.  In Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 64 
the Alaskan Supreme Court faced such a claim when an employee of Norcon alleged 
that her discharge was due to the investigation and subsequent reporting of certain 
safety violations regarding a “zero-tolerance alcohol-free workplace.”65  The court 
recognized that “a retaliatory discharge gives rise to a cause of action for breach of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing.”66  A similar fact pattern was again presented 
in 2001 when a collections officer for a public housing authority reported 
occurrences of mismanagement practices.67  The court not only reiterated the 
holding in Norcon, but also expounded on the decision by outlining the requirements 
necessary to prove a retaliatory discharge claim.68 
                                                 
62 Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.2d 725, 737-38 (Ala. 1987); Metcalf v. Intermountain 
Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 749 (Idaho 1989). 
 
63 Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Mont. 1982) (The court stated, “[t]he 
employee, having [ ] faith that she would be treated fairly, then developed the peace of mind 
associated with job security.”).  See also Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 101 (Del. 1992); 
Sheets v. Knight, 779 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Or. 1989). 
 
64 Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 971 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1999). 
 
65 Id. at 166.  The Plaintiff, Mary Kotowski, was formerly employed by Norcon, Inc. to assist in 
cleaning up the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  While aboard a barge, she investigated employee conduct that 
violated Norcon’s policy which “prohibit[ed] the consumption of alcohol by anyone working on the 
spill or living in contract housing.”  Id. at 161.   
 
66 Id. at 167.  The court emphasized the immateriality of the fact that this was a private workplace 
policy, as opposed to a violation of law.  The breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing was still available for the Plaintiff to use as a cause of action. 
 
67 Lincoln v. Interior Reg’l Hous. Auth., 30 P.3d 582, 584 (Alaska 2001). 
 
68 Id. at 586.  Noting the similarity between the requirements based on the Whistleblower Act and the 
requirements based on retaliatory discharge, the court stated the following elements for retaliatory 
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Another example of a public policy violation that can lead to a breach of the 
covenant is when an employer allegedly terminates an employee for refusing to yield 
to sexual harassment.69  In recognizing this exception the court stated: 
 
Our recognition of this compelling necessary exception in no way 
constitutes an overbroad application of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing that could thereby swallow the at-will 
employment doctrine and effectively end at-will employment.  We 
merely recognize a common law cause of action that provides 
employees with an important weapon to advance Delaware’s avowed 
policy to assure civilized conduct in the workplace.70    
 
C. Breach Where There Exists a Special Relationship of Trust and Reliance 
 
In order to “serve to redress the inherent imbalance between corporations 
and individual employees,”71 Wyoming jurisprudence has evolved to encompass the 
recognition of the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
Jurisprudence involving the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing requires that “[i]n order for a duty to arise, there must be a showing of a 
special relationship of trust and reliance between the employee seeking to recover 
and the employer.”72  According to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, evidence of a 
                                                                                                                                     
discharge: 1) plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; 2) employer subjected the plaintiff to some 
adverse action such as termination; and 3) there exists a causal connection between the activity and 
the adverse action.  
 
69 Schuster v. Derocili, 775 A.2d 1029 (Del. 2001). 
 
70 Id. at 1039.  For examples of other public policy exceptions, see also Wayte v. Rollins Int’l, Inc., 215 
Cal. Rptr. 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing exception for bad faith denial of medical benefits); 
Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981) (finding a cause of action if public 
policy concerns are articulated); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (establishing 
an exception for termination motivated by bad faith and malice).   
 
71 Garcia v. UniWyo Fed. Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 (Wyo. 1996).   
 
72 Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Dexter, 65 P.3d 385, 394 (Wyo. 2003) citing Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 220 (Wyo. 1994).  The issue of whether or not there exists a 
special relationship is a question of fact that must be decided by the trier of fact.  Worley v. Wyo. 
Bottle Co., 1 P.3d 615, 624 (Wyo. 2000). 
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special relationship includes “separate consideration, common law, statutory rights, 
or rights accruing with longevity of service.”73  In Trabing v. Kinko’s, Inc.,74 the court 
stated: 
 
With regard to longevity of service, this court has stated that the 
mere longevity of service is not sufficient to create the special 
relationship leading to tort remedy.  “Usually, the special relationship 
. . . stems from a long term employment relationship coupled with a 
discharge calculated to avoid employer responsibilities to the 
employee, e.g., benefits or commissions.”75   
 
As the case law unfolds, the Wyoming court is gradually contouring the definition of 
“long term employment.”  For example, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that a 
hospital employee, with thirty years of service, terminated in order to deny the 
employee a scheduled pay raise, constituted a genuine issue of material fact.76  
Subsequent cases have emerged in Wyoming whereby employment terms of eight 
                                                 
73 Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 65 P.3d at 394.  The Plaintiff was employed as an activities director at 
Sheridan Nursing Center. Id. at 388. After six years of employment she was terminated. Id. She 
claimed that the termination was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
arguing that her six years of service established the special relationship that was required.  Id. at 394. 
The court, in refusing to hold the employer liable, stated that a breach only exists in “rare and 
exceptional cases” and pointed out that longevity of service alone was insufficient to constitute a 
special relationship.  Id.   
 
74 Trabing v. Kinko’s, Inc., 57 P.3d 1248, 1256 (Wyo. 2002) citing VanLente v. Univ. of Wyo. Research 
Corp., 975 P.2d 594, 598 (Wyo. 1999). 
 
75 Id. quoting Garcia, 920 P.2d at 646.  In Trabing, the employee had dedicated eight years to Kinko’s, 
Inc., working as a branch manager.  The employee argued that a special relationship existed between 
the parties due to the additional consideration of being dedicated to outstanding customer service.  In 
rejecting that a special relationship had been established, the court stated that dedication to customer 
service was “merely performing the duties of her job” as branch manager.  Id. quoting Worley, 1 P.3d at 
626. 
 
76 Jewell v. N. Big Horn Hosp. Dist., 953 P.2d 135, 139 (Wyo. 1998).  Former hospital employee 
argued that her thirty years of service coupled with a termination motivated to deny her a scheduled 
pay raise and other benefits would support her claim for a breach of implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by establishing a special relationship.  The court found that summary judgment was 
inappropriate and that the actual motivation for termination was a genuine issue of material fact.  Id.   
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years77 and six years78 have been deemed to lack the special relationship requirement, 
primarily due to lack of evidence of a “discharge calculated to avoid employer 
responsibilities to the employee,” such as payment of benefits.79   
 
Separate consideration may provide additional evidence of the existence of a 
“special relationship,” according to the Supreme Court of Wyoming.80   In defining 
the principle, the court stated, “a generally accepted definition of consideration is 
that a legal detriment has been bargained for and exchanged for a promise.”81  
                                                 
77 Trabing, 57 P.3d  at 1251. 
 
78 Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 65 P.3d at 388.   
 
79 Garcia, 920 P.2d at 646.   
 
80 Worley, 1 P.3d at 625.  “The rule that permanent employment arrangements are indefinite and hence 
unenforceable created serious inequities when the clear intent of the parties was to bind the employer.  
To correct this situation the courts recognized an exception to the rule when an employee gave extra 
consideration for the job.” Id. quoting J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Implied Contract Rights to Job 
Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 351 (1974).  This extra consideration has been divided into two 
categories: 1) benefits to the employer such as surrender of tort claims, contributions to the business, 
and job training; and 2) special reliance by the employee, such as changing jobs, moving, and reliance 
induced by recruitment techniques.  Id.  The court continued by stating: 
 
[A] contract for “permanent employment” will be construed to be terminable at the 
will of either party except in compelling circumstances, such as where the employee 
in effect purchases the permanent employment by giving a valuable consideration 
other than his customary daily services or otherwise giving up more than one 
normally gives when he agrees to take on new employment.    
 
Id. quoting Bussard v. Coll. of Saint Thomas, Inc., 200 N.W.2d 155, 161 (1972).  The court concluded 
that Wyoming jurisprudence is consistent with the aforementioned definition of separate 
consideration.  In addition, the court concluded that the analysis to be used in order to determine if 
separate consideration exists will be the same analysis that is used in determining if additional 
consideration exists to constitute an express contract as the court had previously discussed in Wilder, 
868 P.2d at 211. 
 
81 Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 712 (Wyo. 1996) citing Moorcroft State Bank v. Morel, 701 
P.2d 1159, 1161-62 (Wyo. 1985).  The employee was discharged after turning over documents that 
implicated her supervisor as a violator of the trade secret policy. Id. at 709.  The court stated, 
“detriment means giving up something which immediately prior thereto the promisee was privileged 
to keep.”  Id. at 712.  In this case the employee was required to turn over the company documents; 
therefore, the court concluded that there was no legal detriment and thus, did not establish a separate 
consideration.  Id.   
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Although precisely defined, the standard has apparently been difficult for employees 
to establish.  In one case, for example, a human resource manager contended that 
her employment relationship was “special” due to the “extremely sensitive human 
resource policy and employment matters.”82 In refusing to characterize this 
relationship as special, the court pointed out that the confidentiality and nature of 
the position were merely “inherent in the duties of a human resource manager.”83   
 
D. Longevity of Service 
 
While longevity of service has emerged as a factor for most courts in the 
decision of whether or not to recognize a breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing,84 length of employment serves as a validation on its own to constitute a 
breach in others.85  One employee’s tenure proved to be sufficient to support a claim 
in Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc.86 In Flanigan, the court stated that 
“[r]espondent’s 28 years of employment by Prudential gave her a secure and 
objective basis for believing that, if her work was satisfactorily performed, her 
employment would continue.”87 Therefore, the fact that the employee had been 
employed for 28 years was alone enough to support her claim for a breach of the 
implied covenant.88 
 
                                                 
82 VanLente, 975 P.2d at 598. 
 
83 Id.   
 
84 Trabing, 57 P.3d at 1255-56 (listing the factors that give rise to a “special relationship”).  
 
85 Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 720 P.2d 257, 261 (Mont. 1986). 
 
86 Id. at 262.  The Plaintiff in this case was employed as a teller for twenty-eight years at which time 
she was terminated due to a reduction in work force.  She sued her former employer for wrongful 
termination, arguing that the employer lacked a fair and honest reason for her discharge.  The court 
recognized that the evidence supported the submission of the case to a jury.  
 
87 Id. at 262. 
 
88 Id. 
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E. Employer’s Conduct Constitutes Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation 
 
Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc.,89 articulated the application of the covenant as 
it pertains to fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  The court, in examining the 
conduct of the employer, held that an “aspect of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” 
must be present in order for the covenant to be considered breached.90  The court 
further articulated such conduct by stating that, “[a]n employer acts in bad faith 
when it induces another to enter into an employment contract through actions, 
words, or the withholding of information, which is intentionally deceptive in some 
material way to the contract.”91  The employee in Merrill alleged that, although he was 
merely a “warm body” to fill the position until the employer could find a 
replacement that was better qualified, the employer intentionally misled him to 
believe that he had employment of an indefinite duration.92   In defeating the motion 
for summary judgment, the court recognized the presence of fraud in this situation.93   
 
In another case, the court analyzed a situation where an employer persuaded 
an employee to remain with the company, despite an offer from a competitor.94  
Approximately four months later, however, the employer terminated the employee.95  
The Supreme Court of Delaware stated, “the employer is liable for misrepresenting 
some important fact, most often the employer’s present intentions, and the employee 
relies thereon either to accept a new position or remain in a present one.”96       
                                                 
89 Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d at 96.   
 
90 Id. at 101. 
 
91 Id. 
 
92 Id. at 102. 
 
93 Id.  See also Bailey v. City of Wilmington, 766 A.2d 477 (Del. 2001).  The Plaintiff, a police officer 
for the city, was terminated after violating several regulations.  After a hearing, the city terminated his 
employment.  The Plaintiff argued that the city manipulated the record, and thus, the procedure was 
improper.  The court noted that the grounds of dismissal must be fraudulent as opposed to the 
procedure that the employer followed.   Therefore, the Plaintiff failed to establish a breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
 
94 Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 526 A.2d 1144 (N.J. 1987), affirmed in 544 A.2d 377 (N.J. 1988). 
 
95 Id. 
 
96 E. I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 442  (Del. 1996). 
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3. RATIONALE OF JURISDICTIONS WHO DECLINE TO RECOGNIZE 
THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING  
IN AN AT-WILL CONTEXT 
 
As this article demonstrates, the breadth of the application of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing in an employment context is multi-faceted.  With an 
abundance of criticism by courts and commentators,97 it is understandable that only a 
minority of jurisdictions recognize the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing as an exception to the at-will rule.   
 
One commentator argued that the perception that an employment 
relationship, absent an agreement to the contrary, will be presumed to be at will is 
incompatible with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applied to that 
at-will relationship.98  When the covenant is imposed in the employment relationship, 
the employer’s absolute prerogative to terminate an employee for any reason or no 
reason at all, as defined by the at-will rule, dissipates.  Interestingly, as one court 
noted, not only are the two principles irreconcilable, but also, “such a claim cannot 
be made by an at-will employee because there is no contract to provide a basis for 
the covenant.”99  In combating this argument, one court has stated that “[t]hese two 
concepts can coexist if careful attention is paid to the objectively reasonable 
expectations of the parties to a contract of employment at-will.”100  Currently, in 
refusing to recognize the covenant, the majority of jurisdictions are, “rejecting 
transplantation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the foreign soil of 
the employment-at-will doctrine.”101  
                                                 
97 See supra note 56.   
 
98 Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
in the Employment Context, 57 MO. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (Fall 1992). The author suggests that the 
employment at-will presumption and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not coexist 
harmoniously. 
 
99 Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 310 (D.C. 2000) citing Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowne, 
Inc., 705 A.2d 627 (D.C. 1997). 
 
100 E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 679 A.2d at 449. 
 
101 Breen, 433 N.W.2d at 224, citing Morriss, 738 P.2d at 851.  Interestingly, in his dissent, Justice Sabers 
stated, “[i]t is the employment-at-will doctrine which is on foreign soil when it is superimposed onto 
308         TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [VOL. 5   
 
  
 
In rejecting the implied covenant argument, the majority of jurisdictions 
typically justify the decision by stating, as one court did: 
 
An employer’s interest in running his business as he sees fit must be 
balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his 
employment and this exception does not strike the proper balance.  
. . .  [T]o imply into each employment contract a duty to terminate in 
good faith would . . . subject each discharge to judicial incursions into 
the amorphous concept of good faith.102  
 
In addition to rejections based on the above referenced reasons, refusal to 
recognize the covenant is also due to redundancy with other principles of law that 
already exist to remedy the situation.  For example, when courts find that the 
employer’s behavior contravenes public policy, the majority of jurisdictions allow an 
exception to the at-will rule, finding an additional claim based on the implied 
covenant superfluous.103   
 
 Other principles of law that provide remedies are the notions of unjust 
enrichment and quasi-contract.104  When an employee has been deprived a benefit, 
such as wages or commissions earned, remedies based on unjust enrichment and 
quasi-contracts become available for the employee.  Arguably, the existence of the 
claim for a breach of the implied covenant is again superfluous. 
 
 In addition to the majority of jurisdictions not recognizing the covenant,105 
several authors writing commentaries on the subject agree that the covenant of good 
                                                                                                                                     
an employment relationship of ten years where justified expectations of continued employment have 
arisen.”  Id.   
 
102 Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wash. 1984). 
 
103 See supra note 56; see also supra note 3.   
 
104 See supra note 3. 
 
105 Although some courts decline to adopt the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an exception 
to the at-will rule, they also recognize that it may be a possibility in the future.  For example, in 
Trimble v. Wash. State Univ., 993 P.2d 259, 263 (Wash. 2000), the court stated, “Washington courts 
have declined to broadly adopt such a covenant in an at will contract.  However, under some 
egregious circumstances an implied covenant of good faith may be appropriate.”  Id. citing Willis 
v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1988). 
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faith and fair dealing should not be applied to an at-will relationship.  One critic, in 
recognizing this proposition, referred to the Covenant as a “miracle cure for 
employment law disputes”106 whereby the “implied covenant analysis [should] be 
abandoned.”107  Further, a Washington court suggested that the legislature would be 
a more appropriate entity to encroach upon the employment relationship.108   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Even though traditional notions of the employment at-will relationship 
continue in the majority of jurisdictions, courts have recently engaged in a closer 
judicial scrutiny of these notions than ever before.  One exception that courts have 
recognized is a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  A 
review of the cases suggests that courts are struggling with the adoption of a precise 
and consistent definition.  Definitions and applications of the exception have run the 
gamut from being pertinent in public policy cases to those involving “special 
relationships.”  Undoubtedly, the debate will continue as to whether the judicial 
exception should be recognized.  In the meantime, employers must be cognizant of 
stated specific rules and the potential for the implementation of new rules.  The 
definitions and applications summarized in this article are intended to increase 
awareness of the current variable state of the exception and to provide clarification 
for practitioners and employers alike.   
                                                 
106 See supra note 56.   
 
107 Id. at 359.   
 
108  Thompson, 685 P.2d at 1086.  The court stated: 
 
While an employer may agree to restrict or limit his right to discharge an employee, 
to imply such a restriction on that right from the existence of a contractual right, 
which, by its terms has no restrictions, is internally inconsistent.  Such an intrusion 
into the employment relationship is merely a judicial substitute for collective 
bargaining which is more appropriately left to the legislative process. 
 
Id. at 1086-87. 
